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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The following are parties to the proceedings:
1.

Petitioner/ Appellant Jayni Searle;

2.

Respondent/Appellee Boyd Searle;

3.

Other persons and entities mentioned are the Fort Peck Assiniboine and

Sioux Tribe and its counsel Gary Beaudry, whom are not parties in the Third
District Court case. These persons and entities participated in the proceedings
before the Third District Juvenile Court and the Fort Peck Tribal Court. While
Appellant makes references to them in her brief and serves copies of the brief
upon Mr. Beaudry, Appellee does not include them because they did not
intervene in the Third District Court case.
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over this appeal of a final
order of the Third District Court involving domestication and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.

Appellant misstates the Court's jurisdiction in her

Jurisdictional Statement asserting that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
"pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure/7

(Appellant's Brief, 1).

That subsection of the statute deals

exclusively with jurisdiction over final orders or decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of those agencies. This appeal does not deal
with an adjudicative proceeding.
There is no dispute that this matter concerns the enforceability of a foreign
judgment.

The Utah Supreme Court would have had jurisdiction over this

matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) had the appeal been timely filed in
the Supreme Court. Consequently, this appeal is improperly filed in the wrong
court and must be dismissed.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee disagrees with Appellant's characterization of the nature of the
issues presented for review.

More particularly, Appellant erroneously

designates factual issues as legal issues and thereby purports to apply an
incorrect standard of review. Appellee will hereinafter recite the issues which
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Appellant presents for review noting Appellee's position as to the nature of the
issue and the appropriate standard of review.
1.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the Writ of
Assistance did not comply with the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act?

Appellant agrees that this issue presents a question of law. Conclusions of
law are reviewed for correctness. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah
App. 1991); Pendeleton v. Pendeleton, 918 P.2d 159,160 (Utah App. 1996); Smith v.
Smith 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990) (hereinafter "Standard of Review"). In
determining the correctness of the trial court's determination, the Appellate
Court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial
judge's determination of law.

State v. Vena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994).

Appellant disagrees that Marguiles By and Through Marguiles v. Upchurch, 696
P.2d 1195, 1199-2000 (Utah 1985) supports the designation of this issue as a
question of law as the case provides no support for the designation.
2.

Did the trial court err when it determined that the Tribal
Court's May 22, 1998 Order, which Transferred custody,
lacked due process with respect to Appellee?

Appellant disagrees with the designation of this issue as a question of law.
This issue involves mixed questions of fact and law.

Findings of Fact are

reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard and will not be set aside unless
they are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence.
Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342, (Utah 1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973
P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998); Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Utah App.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1999); Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P.

(hereinafter "Standard of Review").

Conclusions of law are subject to the standard of review stated with respect to
the first issue, supra.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The legal authorities that are determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal include:
Constitutional Provisions:
U.S. Const, Amend. 5,14
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 24
Statutory Provisions:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l et seq. (1998)
Rules of Procedure:
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a)
STATEMENT OF CASE
In addressing the issues raised by the Appeal, Respondent/Appellee,
Boyd Searle, will be referred to as "the grandfather" and Petitioner/Appellant,
Jayni Searle will be referred to as "the mother."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

Nature of Case.
This case concerns the enforceability of a foreign judgment entered by the

Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court (hereinafter "the Fort Peck Tribal
Court") located on an Indian Reservation in Poplar, Montana.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
In February 1998, the grandfather filed in the Third District Juvenile Court

(hereinafter "the Juvenile Court") a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of
the mother in relation her minor child. (R. 454). The Juvenile Court granted
temporary custody of the child to the grandfather on March 3, 1998. (R. 454).
The mother filed in he Juvenile Court a Petition to Transfer to the Fort Peck
Tribal Court.

The Juvenile Court transferred jurisdiction over the pending

Petition to Terminate Parental Rights to the Fort Peck Tribal Court. (R. 454). On
May 22, 1998, the Tribal Court issued an ex-parte order accepting jurisdiction
and transferring custody of the minor child to the mother. (R. 454). On May 28,
1998 the mother filed a Petition for Writ of Assistance with the Third District
Court, (hereinafter "the trial court") Judge Timothy R. Hanson, presiding,
seeking enforcement of the May 22,1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order.
(R. 1, 454). The mother later filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Assistance.
(R. 103-104). The mother filed a Notice to Submit requesting the trial court rule
on the pleadings. (R. 28-29). The grandfather filed an objection and requested a
hearing. (R. 151-183). On March 8,1999, the trial court convened a hearing and
dismissed the Petition for Writ of Assistance on grounds that the action was not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
4 may contain errors.

properly filed under the Foreign Judgment Act and the Tribal Court order is not
entitled to full faith and credit because the grandfather's due process rights were
violated. (R. 334; 453-457).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
The appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

This matter

involves an appeal of a final order of the Third District Court involving
domestication and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The Court of Appeals
does not have jurisdiction over this matter. The Utah Supreme Court would
have had jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0 had
the appeal been timely filed in the Supreme Court.
II.
The mother's brief should be stricken and the appeal dismissed for
noncompliance with Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by
failing to cite to the record showing preservation in the trial court of each issue
presented for review.
III.
The mother's brief contains factual allegations that should be stricken for
failure to cite where they are supported in the record.
IV.
The mother's Writ of Assistance, by its very language, required
compliance with the Foreign Judgment Act.

The record is replete with

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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admissions that she did not comply with the statutory filing requirements and
even conceded that the trial court's determination that the Foreign Judgment Act
applied was correct. The issues related to the Foreign Judgment Act were not
preserved for appellate review as a consequence of her admissions on the record.
Moreover, the appeal of this issue is frivolous because the mother admits in her
brief that the Foreign Judgment Act was not the vehicle for the enforcement she
sought, yet she appeals the trial court's refusal to issue a writ containing
language that it was issued pursuant to the Foreign Judgment Act.
V.
The trial court's determination that due process was violated in relation to
the Tribal Court order hinges on the factual finding that the grandfather was not
provided any notice of a hearing or that there would be a ruling on custody.
This is a mixed question of fact and law rather than a simply question of law as
proposed by the mother. The mother's challenge of factual findings should be
disregarded because of her failure to marshal the evidence and demonstrate the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding. Even if the mother had
marshaled the evidence, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding
of lack of notice. In the absence of notice, the right to due process has been
violated. The appeal is frivolous because the record is replete with the mother's
admissions that due process requires notice and that the grandfather was not
given notice.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over this appeal of a final
order of the Third District Court involving domestication and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.

The mother misstates the Court's jurisdiction in her

Jurisdictional Statement asserting that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
"pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure."

(Appellant's Brief, 1).

That subsection of the statute deals

exclusively with jurisdiction over final orders or decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the those agencies. This appeal does not
deal with an adjudicative proceeding. Further, Rule 3 confers no jurisdiction on
a specific appellate court but provides the procedure by which the notice of
appeal allows the appropriate court to take jurisdiction.
It is undisputed that this matter concerns the enforceability of a foreign
judgment.

The trial court found the action was one to domestic a foreign

judgment, the court clerk designated the action a "special matter," and the
mother characterizes her petition as "An Action...to enforce a May 22, 1998
Order from the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court." (T. 31; R. 9,11;
Appellants' Brief, 3), The Utah Supreme Court would have had jurisdiction
over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), because it involves an order
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over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction,
had the appeal been timely filed in the Supreme Court.
However, the Supreme Court cannot take jurisdiction over an appeal,
which is not timely brought before it, and an untimely appeal will be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Bowen v.
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983).
The thirty day period within which this matter could have been appealed to the
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure has
expired. Consequently, this appeal is improperly filed in the wrong court and
must be dismissed.
II.
THE MOTHER'S BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN FOR
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(a)(5).
The mother's brief should be stricken and the appeal dismissed for
noncompliance with Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by
failing to cite to the record showing preservation in the trial court of each issue
presented for review. The rule expressly mandates:
(a) Brief of appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain
under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for
each issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting
authority; and (A) citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court; or (B) a statement of grounds for
seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.
Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Emphasis added.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The mother's brief contains a statement of the issues presented for review,
but does not provide citations to the record demonstrating they were preserved
in the trial court or allege alternative grounds for seeking review of issues not
preserved. The clear language of the rule makes it mandatory. Neither the
Appellate Court nor the opposing party should bear the burden of fleshing out
the record to determine the issues were properly raised and litigated or that
timely objections and motions were made as required. State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d
819, 120-21 (Utah 1989) (specific and timely objections must be made before the
lower court and then identified for the appellate court.). Consequently, the
mother's brief is defective and should be stricken.
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE MOTHER'S BRIEF
SHOULD BE STRICKEN FOR LACK OF CITATION OR SUPPORT IN THE
RECORD.
The mother's brief contains factual allegations that should be stricken for
failure to cite support in the record. Facts that should be stricken are found in
pages 21 through 24, where factual allegations are made regarding a June 8,1998
telephonic hearing involving both the Juvenile Court and the Tribal Court.
Specifically, these pages make reference to a hearing cited in the mother's
"Statement of the Case/Facts/ 7 (Appellant's Brief, 5-6). Those earlier citations
are to a document stating, "On June 8th, 1998, the tribal court and juvenile courts
issues [sic] stays of the proceedings pending hearing before an appeals or federal
court on the issue of whether the juvenile court had any jurisdiction to enter such
an order/7 (R. 328). Nothing more is revealed in that citation regarding the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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purpose of the hearing, the substance of the issues addressed, or any other fact
regarding what occurred at said hearing.
Notwithstanding the absence of additional facts, the mother's brief later
expands on those meager references in the record and purports that
a)

the grandfather "had a fair opportunity to object and fight

the issues raised by the order at the June 8,1998 hearing;"
b)

the grandfather "was able to present his arguments;"

c)

the grandfather "had nearly a four month window in which

to file pleadings before the Tribal Court to seek custody;"
Contrary to these unsupported factual allegations, the transcript contains
argument that these things did not occur, but rather the grandfather was told he
had no right to object to the lack of notice because he had no right to due process
in the Tribal Court. The transcript indicates the grandfather was told that he
already had his due process in the state court and the Tribal Court would do as it
pleased. (T. 24). There is absolutely no record supporting the factual assertion
that the grandfather was given a hearing during the telephonic conference on the
lack of notice prior to entry of the Tribal Court's May 22,1998 order, or that he
was given the opportunity to present his arguments regarding the transfer of
custody. The only references in the record state otherwise—that the door was
closed when the Tribal Court rejected the principle that the grandfather had due
process rights in the Tribal Court in the first instance.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Regardless of the mother's position on those facts, there is no record
indicating that the grandfather was given any kind of hearing to review whether
the circumstances in the Tribal Court amounted to due process. There is no
notice of hearing, no minute entry or transcript of the hearing supporting the
mother's contentions.
The Utah Supreme Court in Uckerman v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co. refused
to consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record. 588 P.2d
142 (Utah 1978). Consequently, facts contained in pages 21 through 24 in the
mother's brief should be stricken and not considered.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE MOTHER DID
NOT COMPLY WITH THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT AND THAT
COMPLIANCE WAS A PREREQUISITE TO ISSUING THE WRIT OF
ASSISTANCE.
The Foreign Judgment Act deals with three pertinent issues: the filing and
commencing of an action on a foreign judgment; the foreign judgment debtor's
right to a stay; and the foreign judgment creditor's right to a lien. Because this
matter relates to a child rather than a money judgment, the only relevant issue is
the filing requirements:
"(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, at the time
of filing a foreign judgment, shall file an affidavit with the clerk of
the district court stating the last known post-office address of the
judgment debtor and the judgment creditor.
"(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and affidavit, the clerk of
the district court shall notify the judgment debtor that the judgment
has been filed. Notice shall be sent to the address stated in the
affidavit. The clerk shall record the date the notice is mailed in the
register of actions."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,11
may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-3(l)&(2) (Emphasis added) (Addendum, 1).
The trial court ruled the Fort Peck Tribal Court's Order is a foreign
judgment that must be filed under the Foreign Judgment Act and the mother did
not comply with the statute by simply filing a Petition for Writ of Assistance:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
The May 22,1998 Order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court
transferring custody from respondent to petitioner is a foreign
judgment.
2.
As a foreign judgment, the judgment must be filed in
accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §
78-22a-l, et seq.
3.
The Petition for Writ of Assistance does not comply
with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
(Conclusions f 1-3; R. 453-457; Addendum, 2-5).
The trial court's ruling is a conclusion of law subject to the correctness
Standard of Review. Howell 806 P.2d at 1211; Pendeleton, 918 P.2d at 160; Smith,
793 P.2d at 409. In determining the correctness of the trial court's determination,
the Appellate Court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree
to the trial judge's determination of law. Vena, 869 P.2d at 935.
A.

Noncompliance with the filing requirements of the
Foreign Judgment Act constitutes noncompliance with the
statute.

The trial court correctly determined that the Writ of Assistance did not
comply with the Foreign Judgment Act because the mother conceded
noncompliance with the filing provisions of the statute. (Appellant's Brief, 12-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

13). The question answers itself in the mother's brief, although she attempts to
argue a different issue than the one presented for review. The mother frames the
first issue presented for review as, "T)id the trial court err in concluding that the
Writ of Assistance did not comply with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act?" She
then concedes she did not abide by the statute's filing requirements but proceeds
to argue a different issue, namely that there are alternative ways to enforce a
judgment and that noncompliance with the provisions of the statute should not
have resulted in dismissal of the Writ of Assistance. (Appellant's Brief, 10-13).
The mother's arguments in regard to alternative ways to enforce a foreign
judgment should be disregarded because it is not the issue presented for review
and does not affect the determination of whether the court erred in concluding
that the manner in which the Writ of Assistance was filed did not comply with
the statutory provisions of the Foreign Judgment Act.
Even if the Appellate Court were inclined to reach an issue not specifically
presented for review, the mother did not preserve for appellate review the issue
of alternatives other than the Foreign Judgment Act. An issue is preserved for
appellate review when three requirements are satisfied: i) the issue must be
raised in a timely fashion; ii) the issue must be specifically raised; and iii) a party
must introduce supporting evidence or provide relevant legal authority. Hart v.
Salt lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The three
requirements are intended to "put the judge on notice of the asserted error and
allow [ ] the opportunity for correction at the time in the course of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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proceeding/'

Borberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The

rational for preservation of issues is that the trial court, in fairness, ought to have
the chance to correct its own errors. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1225-26,1227
(Utah 1998).
Contrary to this standard, the mother expressed through counsel to the
trial court that she "wasn't sure whether the Foreign Judgment applied or not,"
to which the trial court respond, "of course it applies." (T. 21). She further
conceded she "wasn't sure whether it applied just to sister states or to all foreign
judgments," and that she "wasn't sure which was the proper way," that she
"allowed the Court to determine that" and that the trial court "probably
determined it correctly." (T. 21-22). By conceding that she left it for the trial
court to determine whether the statute applied because she did not know and
conceding that the trial court probably determined it correctly, she failed to
provide the trial court relevant legal authority or the requisite opportunity to
correct the alleged error. Consequently, the issue was not preserved and is
improper for appellate review.
The mother's admission that she did not file the action in accordance to
the procedures set forth in the Foreign Judgment Act amounts to an admission
that there was no compliance with the statute. She unabashedly admits that she
did not file an affidavit stating the last known address of the grandfather.
Instead she opted for filling out the civil action cover sheet and including the
grandfather's last known address. (Appellant's Brief, 12-13). She further admits
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

that the clerk of the district court did not send notice to the grandfather's address
or record the date in the register of actions. Instead she opted for mailing notice
herself to the grandfather's attorney. (Appellant's Brief, 12). She argues this
should be good enough.
Inasmuch as the mother admits in her brief that the mandatory statutory
provisions were not adhered, the Appellate Court should accept her answer that
she did not comply with the statute and should disregard further argument once
the issue she presents for review, "did the writ comply with ilie statute?/' has been
determined.
B.

The appeal of the trial court's denial of the Writ of
Assistance is frivolous because there is no dispute that the
requirements of the Foreign Judgment Act were not
adhered.

The mother's brief fails to mention that this appeal is based on the trial
court's denial of a request for entry of an "Amended Writ of Assistance"
containing the following language:
"The Court hereby concludes that, pursuant to 25 U.S.C.
1911(d) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l et seq., the order of the
tribal court is properly before the court for domestication. Based
upon this conclusion, the Court hereby recognizes the Order of the
Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court, gives it full faith and
credit, and domesticates the order. Based upon good cause
appearing in the record before the Court and in Plaintiff's Petition
for Writ of Assistance, the Court hereby orders that the Sheriff, Law
Enforcement, or Constable to use any and all necessary and
reasonable means to secure the person of Chad Searle and deliver
him to Jim C. Shirley at 9 Exchange Place, Suite 400, Salt Lake City,
Utah for delivery to the natural mother. Any and all necessary and
reasonable means shall include, but not limited to, entrance upon
the premises located at; (1) the residence at 4885 South 3640 West,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Kearns, Utah; (2) the residence at 4906 South 4460 West, Kearns,
Utah; or (3) Arcadia Elementary at 3461 West 4850 South, Kearns,
Utah and execute upon the attached Order/ 7 (Emphasis added.)
(R. 103-104; Addendum, 6-7)
Despite the writ's reliance oi L 1 he I?oreigi i Ji idgn lei i,1 • \,cl (i e [ Jtah Code
A i n i § 78-22; t 1 < >t si >q.) the mother raises the two arguments discussed supra
challenging the trial court's decision not to issue the writ m grounds that she did
not compl> with the provisions of the Foreign judgnu •

^

tl lere are alternate e means of en forcement besides the Foreign Judgment Act,
and, b) that she substantially complied

n

the Foreign Judgment Act's

provisions. (Appellant's Brief, 10-13).
• Fituii ni114»» mofliet <- JIji^uiiM'iiii I'h.ii iln'iv are alteniitiyes to Mv hnvign.
Judgment Act is irrelevant because the Writ of Assistance she sought specifically
requested a finding that "pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-22a-l et seq, the
order of the Inbal court is properly before the IOIJI! lor <l< -niesth alion

"Stu did

i w\ M I 4 iiiii i I'JIti" "iLilniy; "thai tin totvign order was domesticated by some
alternative procedure but that it was properly domesticated under the Foreign
Judgment Act or Utah i ode Ann, fc /'8-J2a-l ei, .sr</ J he trial court had nu choice
Inn inn Ii'ir, iht- hiil heiausf" tin "attemaf i\ es.

a TI incongruous with the

language of the writ citing compliance with the Foreign Judgment Act.
Second, despite the mother's argument that she "substantially complied77
hit!) Hit hueiejni (ud^nnent AM, Ilia !Vt]|iii!Viiienih ol Hie statute related hi the
manner in which an action is filed, which she did not follow. Her failure to make
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the designation on the civil cover sheet, her failure to file an affidavit, and the
clerk's subsequent failure to send notice to the grandfather and record the notice
in the register of actions circumvents the very heart of the statute.

(R. 9;

Appellant's Brief, 12-13).
Most importantly, the appeal of this issue is frivolous under Rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as demonstrated by the following statement
contained in the mother's brief, "As argued above, the Foreign Judgment Act
was not the vehicle for enforcement/7 (Appellant's Brief, 13). In essence, the
mother argues the trial court committed error in denying the writ for
noncompliance with the statute because she did not seek enforcement under the
Foreign Judgment Act.

The argument is not grounded in fact because the

language of her own writ reveals she sought enforcement under the statute.
Therefore, the mother's insistence that the Appellate Court determine the trial
court should issue a writ containing language that the foreign order was properly
domesticated pursuant to the Foreign Judgment Act when she admits employing
alternative procedures and claims the Foreign Judgment Act was not the vehicle for
enforcement renders the appeal frivolous because it is not grounded in fact or
warranted by existing law. The Appellate Court should affirm the trial court's
ruling and sanction the mother in the amount of attorneys fees and costs
incurred by the grandfather in connection with responding to this frivolous
appeal.
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v
T H E T R I A L C O U R T , s K U L I N G j H A j D U £ PROCESS WAS
VIOLATED CANNOT BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT HINGES ON A
FACTUAL FINDING THAT THE GRANDFATHER WAS NOT GIVEN
NOTICE AND THE MOTHER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
TO DEMONSTRATE CLEAR ERROR.

The trial co i irt s i i llii ig regardii ig tl le cii le pi ocess Issue as contained in the
Order of Dismissal states:
FINDINGS OF FACT
4.
The Third District juvenile Court, Judge Olof A.
Johansson, presiding, transferred jurisdiction over a pending
Petition for Termination to the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
. 5.
The Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted jurisdiction and
transferred custody of the minor child on May 22,1998.
6.
Boyd Searle was not provided notice that the > t
Peck I ribal Court would issue an Order on the issue of custody.
7. • Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Assistance with
this Court seeking assistance of this Court in enforcing the May 22,
1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court custody order.
;

( ON< I ti'SIONSt M I A W

4.
Petitioner was entitled to be heard at a hearing prior
to the transfer of custody by the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
5
The failure to give respondent an opportunity to be
heard at a hearing prior to transfer of custody constitutes a
violation of respondent's due process rights.
6.
As such, the May 22,1998 Order transferring custody
is not entitled to full faith and credit....
(Findings f 4-7; Conclusions f 4-6; R. 453-457; Addendum, 2-5).
1 'he trial court s legal conch isioi i that cit le proc sss v as \ violated hinges on
a factual finding that the grandfather was not given notice of a hearing or that
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there would be a ruling on custody. Findings of Fact are subject to the clearly
erroneous Standard of Review and will not be set aside unless they are so lacking
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young, 979 P.2d at
342 (Utah 1999); Pennington, 973 P.2d at 937 (Utah 1998); Johnson, 977 P.2d at
1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P.
Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness. Howell, 806 P.2d at 1211;
Pendeleton, 918 P.2d at 160; Smith, 793 P.2d at 409. In determining the correctness
of the trial court's determination, the Appellate Court decides the matter for itself
and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. Pena,
869 P.2d at 935.
A.

Because the trial court found there was no notice and
concluded Due Process was therefore violated, the
Standard of Review is a mixed standard of clear error on
the facts and correctness on the legal significance of the
facts.

The mother's second issue asks, "Did the trial court err when it
determined that the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order, which transferred
custody, lacked due process with respect to Appellee?" As discussed supra, this
is a mixed question of fact and law rather than simply a question of law as
proposed by the mother. As such, the mother must marshal the evidence to
challenge the factual findings. The mother's brief is defective because of her
failure to marshal the evidence and should be disregarded on this issue.
B.

Failure to marshal the evidence obligates the Appellate
Court to assume the findings are correct.
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Appi'lltiU1 i (UJils w ill mi if address challenges to factual findings unless the
appellant has properly marshaled the evidence. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,
433-34 (Utah 1998). Marshalling the evidence entails listing ai; n.,- e\ lacnce
supporting the cl lallenged fii idii ig. 3 ingey v Chnslettsen -s

(I Jtaii 1 999).

Io

j l o w that the factual finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, an

appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insunn u- t tc • s i ippoi t 1:1 i.e fii tdings e\ en
in viewiinj' ill in tin' lighl most favorable to the court below/' Pennington, 973
P.2d at 937 (Utah 1998); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah
1989). ' T o successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal,
appellai i;t n in ist i i tarsi lal tl i.e e < ddei ice in: i si lpp :)i t • :: f tl: te findings

i
a men

demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support a* : "v 'against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them
'clearly erroneous ' i ala tree v. Fitzgerah f, 961 P 2( 1:3135 31 2(1 Jtal i/l 998).
The mother's brief vacillates between challenging the trial court's finding
that there was no notice, admitting there was no notice, arguing lack of notice
was curet- :n
nmsidered

..

jbsequent hearing, complaining llio evulniu"

.mil iv*|iH»slmg the Appellate Court "remand so that the District

Court can make a determination based upon all the evidence."
Brief, 21-27). These arguments are self defeating as they ii<
SUHKMOIII

\ ill tin n u i t i h t

idateil h. tIn* lailu.iil liiidm^ • ,<

received no notice.

'

•

not
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C.

The evidence is not legally insufficient to support the
factual finding of no notice.

The mother makes a weak attempt in her brief to challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence as follows, "The District Court had this evidence before it, but
did not consider this evidence in making its ruling... Rather than considering the
evidence, the District Court did not look at the surrounding circumstances at the
entry of the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order... However, a full review of the
facts before the Court, the Tribal Court's order did not lack due process because
Appellee had notice of the Invalidation Petition and had an opportunity to be
heard on the issues raised therein." (Appellant's Brief, 19). This challenge falls
short of listing all the facts supporting the findings and then demonstrating the
evidence is insufficient.
Despite the mother's disagreement with the trial court's interpretation of
the evidence, there is sufficient evidence the grandfather received no notice. By
way of example, the mother confirms no notice in her brief saying, "While,
ignoring the argument above regarding appropriate notice of the Invalidation
Petition, Appellee did not have notice that the Tribal Court could enter an order
accepting jurisdiction and changing custody, pursuant to the May 15, 1998
Juvenile Court order." (Appellant's Brief, 21-22). The transcript captured the
mother's several other admissions of no notice:
The Court: Well, wait a minute. The juvenile court transfers this
to the tribal court. The tribal court enters its order. Did they ever
give Boyd Searle any notice so he could be heard before they
decided to issue the order?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Shirley: Before
jurisdiction?
The Court:

they

issued —the

issue

of

accepting

No. Taking custody.

Mr. Shirk} :: 1 1 ie\ did i tot 1 ia\ e a hearii ig at tl lat tii i le i t,o.
(T. 8).

The Court: Well did somebody tell him when they were going to
have a hearing so he could show up at the tribal court and say,
"Wait a minute, I don't want to do this?"
Mr. Shirley: rhey did not have a hearing at the time, \ our Honor.
However, on June 8th, there was a hearing which involved the
petitioner. Petitioner, respondent and the tribal court and the
juvenile court, as well as counsel for the tribe, Mr. Beaudry.
The Court:

I hose being to entoru 4 an ord< i iii l\Li\ of 1998?

Mr Shirley : \ eal i
The Court:

One that was issued without notice to Mr. Searle?

Mr. Shirley: Yes, your honor.
(T.8-9).
******

The Court:
custody.

The tribal court accepts jurisdiction and changes

N lr.! >hirlev: \ es
The i <
' »iirl

They didn't give Mr. Searle notice.

Mr. Shirley: That they intended to take that action, no.
The Court:
(T. 14).

Then tell me how you get due process...
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Those admissions were followed by the grandfather's counsel reiterating
his contentions found in the pleadings:
Ms. Santana: Because my client was not provided an opportunity
to be heard, the tribal court then entered an order ex parte upon an
oral motion made by the tribe, and there was a hearing, despite Mr.
Shirley's representation that there was no hearing. There was a
hearing and the only person that was invited was the attorney for
the tribe. And then they entered an order...[and] transferred
custody to [the mother].
(T. 23).
After hearing the arguments and reviewing the pleadings, the trial court
ruled on the evidence:
The Court: [ ] I'm satisfied that ...the materials that have been
presented to me here, both in oral argument and with the file,
indicate that Mr. Searle was given no notice and no opportunity to
be heard with regard to the orders that were issued by the tribal
court on May 22,1998.
(T. 35).
D.

Due Process cannot be satisfied in the absence of notice.

The mother's argument that due process was afforded despite the absence of
notice defies legal reasoning because notice is the fundamental element of due
process. "Questions frequently arise as to the adequacy of a particular form of
notice in a particular case... But as to the basic requirement of notice itself there
can be no doubt...." Armstrong v. Nlanzo, 380 U.S. 545,550 (1965) (notice required
where the judicial proceedings permanently deprived a parent of parental
rights). "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and attord lln n an o p p nlni.il', lr ("tvsnit

IIUMV

obitrtions. Armstrong o. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Mu/ane i?. Centra/ Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 114.;
Estate of/ones, Matter of, 858 P.2d 983 (Utah 1993); Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 I 2d 157
(I Jtal it. 1 993),

' [ ' \ ] foreigi t. ji ldgn lent i endered

i inder circi n nstai ices 1 hat

amount to lack of due process is not entitled to full faith and credit in Utah."
Holm, 840 P.2d at 164 (Utah 1993)

Data Management Sysytems In, V. EDP 709

I 2d 377, ;V7^ (ULih 1985)
1 Ii. nifties a^nv I hat the Tribal Court order, which awarded "temporary
care, custody and control;'" was final, although they disagree on the reasons for
finality.

(Addendum, 8). *b° mother argues the order is final because the

grai iiifather failed to app

-* * •

(Appellant's Brief 25)

11 le grandfather

argues the order is final because he was directly told during a subsequent
telephonic conference with the Tribal Court that he had no due process rights in
their court ami beiausr 111*• s n uiitinucd l o r n i o n e llhit" iinnpoian nrdn Ii miii^ jftrr
me underlying action had been dismissed. (T. 23-24). The order was final as to
the grandfather's rights because of the Tribal Court's unwillingness to allow him
to meaningfully participate and 1 1 t.e i n iprecedei ited actio t i of ei i forcii ig a
lUitipotan oidtT from a dismissed case, not because the order itself legitimately
became final and absolute.
E,

A temporary order from an action that has been dismissed
is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit.
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Notwithstanding the obvious unenforceability of an order entered
without due process, another essential element for enforcement of a foreign
order is that the order must be accorded finality. Estate of Jones, 858 P.2d at 985,
(Utah 1993). As explained supra, this order was a temporary order from an
action already dismissed in the Tribal Court. Consequently, the order was not
final in any legal sense and was not subject to enforceability in Utah under the
Estate of Jones standard.
F.
The appeal of the trial court's conclusion that Due Process
was violated is frivolous because there is no dispute that the
grandfather was not provided notice.
Once again, the appeal of this second issue is frivolous under Rule 33 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as demonstrated by the following
statement contained in the mother's brief, "Appellant does not dispute that a
fundamental requirement of due process is notice and an opportunity to be
heard." (Appellant's Brief, 21). In essence, the mother argues the trial court
must have committed error in reaching the legal conclusion that the right to due
process was violated while admitting both that there was no notice and that notice
is a fundamental element of due process. The argument is not grounded in fact or
law because the lack of notice and the legal necessity of notice are undisputed.
Therefore, the mother's insistence that the Appellate Court conclude that due
process was satisfied in the absence of notice renders the appeal frivolous because
it is not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. The Appellate Court
should affirm the trial court's ruling and sanction the mother in the amount of
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attorneys ie«3 ami utsK imunvJ lb1 flu1 I'miultathei in connection with
responding to this frivolous appeal.
CONCLUSION
1 he Court \ :)f Appeals shoi Ud disn liss 1 he appeal for lack of jurisdiction
because the Supreme Court is the proper court 'wherein jurisdiction lay.
Alternatively,

:he merits of the arguments, the Appellate Court must affirm

the trial o»ui: ^ nnru; ibecause it correctly applied 1 1 i.e la;\ \ ai id zommitted no

Respectfully submitted thjs/s2" day

Irra Cristina Santana
Attorney for Appellee, Boyd Searle

IT.RTirK' VI'I'.OI'SEK HCF!,

I hereby certify that on thi£/^> day o T ^ > M , 2000,1 caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by US mail upon:
Jim C. Shirley
10 E. Exchange Place, Suite
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
^

&AA^
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ADDENDUM
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78-22-1.1

JUDICIAL CODE

411

filed and docketed in any court of this state and shall have the
same force and effect as a judgment entered in that court.
(4) Prior to July 1,1997, a judgment entered in the small
claims division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon
real property unless filed and docketed in accordance with
Subsection (3). This Subsection (4) shall apply to all small
claims judgments entered on or after April 27,1992.
IWJ

Section
78-22a-7.
78-22a-8.

78-22-1.1, Judgment against party dying after verdict
or decision*
A judgment rendered where a party dies after a verdict or
decision upon any issue of fact, and before judgment, is not a
lien on the real property of the deceased party, but is payable
in the course of the administration of his estate.
ion

78-22a-2* Definition — Filing and •tat'iu of foreip
judgments.
(1) As used in this chapter, "foreign judgment" meant u j
judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United State* or a*
any other court whose acts are entitled to full faith and credit
in this state.
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in i
dance with an appropriate act of Congress or an appropriiM
act of Utah may be filed with the clerk of any district courts
Utah. The clerk of the district court shall treat the foreip
judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district court if
Utah.
(3) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter hai tb
same effect and is subject to the same procedures, detent*
enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a distria
court of this state
1M

78-22-1*5. Definitions — Judgment recorded in Registry of Judgments.
(1) For purposes of this section, "Registry of Judgments*
means the index where a judgment shall be recorded and
searchable by the name of the judgment debtor through
electronic means or by tangible document.
(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment rendered or
recorded in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect
the title to real property unless the judgment is recorded in
the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the
district court of the county in which the property is located.
1*97

78-22-2. Judgment against sheriff — When conclusive
against sureties on indemnity bond.
If an action is brought against a sheriff for an act done by
virtue of his office and he gives written notice thereof to the
sureties on any bond of indemnity received by him, the
judgment recovered therein is conclusive evidence of his right
to recover against such sureties; and the court, or judge in
vacation, may, on motion, upon notice of five days, order
judgment to be entered against them for the amount so
recovered, including costs.
19SS
78-22-3. J u d g m e n t b y confession authorized.
A judgment by confession may be entered without action,
either for money due or to become due or to secure any person
against contingent liability on behalf of the defendant, or both,
in the manner prescribed by law. Such judgment may be
entered in any court having jurisdiction for like amounts.
1963

78-22-4. Blileage allowance for judgment debtor required to appear. '
Every judgment debtor legally required to appear before a
district court or a master to answer concerning his, her, or its
property is entitled, on a sufficient showing of need, to mileage
of 15 cents per mile for each mile actually and necessarily
traveled in going only, to be paid by the judgment creditor at
whose instance the judgment debtor was required to appear,
but the judgment creditor is not required £o make any payment for such mileage until the judgment debtor has actually
appeared before the court or master.
iLi i iH"*!.
CHAPTER 22a

f

FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT
Section
78-22a*l.
78-22a-2.
78-22a-3.
78-22a-4.
78-22a-5.
78-22a-6.

Short title.
'
Definition — Filing: and status of foreign judgments.
4
*
Notice of filing. \
I
y
Stay.
.*
Lien.
Optional procedure.

Repealed.
Uniformity of 1111«r j i r«i. HI 11 mi

78-22a-l. Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Uuk
Foreign Judgment Act."
ua

78-22a-3. N o t i c e o f filing.
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, atlst
time of filing a foreign judgment, shall file an affidavit with tat
clerk of the district court stating the last known post-offia
address of the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor.
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and affidavit, tk
clerk of the district court shall notify the judgment debtor that
the judgment has been filed. Notice shall be sent to tk
address stated in the affidavit. The clerk shall record the dstt
the notice is mailed in the register of actions. The notice ihil
include the name and post-office address of the judgmei
creditor and the name and address of the judgment creditor^
attorney, if any.
(3) No execution or other process for the enforcement of i
foreign judgment-fiied-tmdeiL|^ chapter may issue until 31
days afteirfneJudgment is
filedT^
in
78-22a-4. Stay.
(1) If an appeal from a foreign judgment is pending, tk
time for appeal has not expired, or a stay of execution hai be*
granted, the court, upon proof that the judgment debtor BSJ
furnished security for satisfaction of the judgment in the it*
in which the judgment was rendered shall stay enforcement •*
the judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appal
expires, or until the stay of execution expires or is vacated.
(2) If the foreign judgment debtor, upon motion, ahowitk
district court any ground upon which enforcement of ijudf
ment of a district court of this state would be stayed, the CMS
shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment upon tk
posting of security in the kind and amount required to sUf
M
enforcement of a domestic judgment
78-22a-5. L i e n .
(1) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter becootfu
lien as provided in Section 78-22-1 if a stay of execution Is
not been granted.
(2) If the requirements of this chapter are satisfied, tk
foreign judgment becomes a lien upon the judgment debMrij
property on the date it is docketed.
78-22a-6. Optional p r o c e d u r e .
This chapter shall not be construed to impair a judgnai
creditor's right to bring an action in this state to enforce adl
creditor's judgment.
Ml
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.nird Judicial District

JUL 2 6 1339
COUNTY

By

^

Deputy Clerk

t
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ^JUDICIAL DISTRICT
r

IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE: COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE,
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
CASE NO. 980905344

JAYNI SEARLE,
Petitioner,

vs.
BOYD SEARLE,
Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 8,
1999 for hearing on petitioner's Petition for Writ of Assistance.
Jim C. Shirley appeared representing petitioner, Jayni Searle.
Maria Cristina Santana
Searle.

appeared

representing

Boyd Searle personally appeared.

respondent, Boyd

The parties have filed

extensive pleadings regarding the issues before the Court, the
parties made their respective arguments. The Court having reviewed
the file, having properly considered all the oral and written
arguments submitted to the Court by the parties, the Court hereby
makes the following:
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SEAR II

V SEARLE

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

PAGE TWO

FINDINGS OF FACT
.• 1 . • ' I n

February

of 1998,

respondent

l, J. I. eel

i n i il il

"If h i r d

District Juvenile Court a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights
of Jayni Searle ::i n relation t o chad Searj. .
2.
Custody

Subsequently, respondent filed a n E x Parte M o t i o n for
obtained

mi Ki i i\n il

ruder <

Temporary Custody o n

March 3 # 1998,
3.
in March
4.

• P e t i t I.'ni,fi f i I c Il r, ill11,-ill 11 i "in to Transfer t o Tribal Court
- 1998.
T h e Third

Johansson, presiding,

District

Juvenile

transferred

Court #

jurisdictioni

Judge O l o
"<•

|

Petition for Termination t o the Fort Peck Tribal C o u r t .
5. . The Fort Peck Tribal

u ill iKrwpl

-'i/i J.i I I

transferred custody o f the m i n o r child o n M a y
• 6.

1.

lll11111

, Vo\'t,

' Petit in on lie i f:i I

I
l

1998.

Boyd searle wa&

Tribal Court would issue a n Order

i

peck

* * issue o f custody.

Petition

l

o f A s s i s t a n c e with

this Court seeking assistance o f this Court i n enforcing the M a y
22,

1998 Fort Peck Tribal Cqurt custody Order.
#•
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regarding
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The parties have subsequently filed numerous pleadings
the appropriateness

of

the issuance

of

a Writ of

Assistance.
9.

Petitioner also subsequently filed a Motion to give Full

Faith and Credit to two subsequent Tribal Court Orders.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby
enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The May 22, 1998 Order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court

transferring custody from respondent to petitioner is a foreign
judgment.
2.

As a foreign judgment/ the judgment must be filed in

accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann.,
Section 78-22a-l, et seq.
3.

The Petition for Writ of Assistance does not comply with

the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
4.

Petitioner was entitled to be heard at a hearing prior to

the transfer of custody by the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
5.

The failure to give respondent an opportunity to be heard

at a hearing prior to transfer of custody constitutes a violation
of respondent's due process rights.
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As such, the May 22, 1998 Order transferring custody is

not entitled to full faith and credit.
7.

The subsequent Tribal Court Orders are not before the

Court under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court hereby enters the following:
ORDER
1.

The Petition for Writ of Assistance is denied.

2.

The action is dismissed with prejudice as to the Fort

Peck Tribal Court May 22, 1998 Order.
3.

The above-entitled action is dismissed without prejudice

as to any Order entered subsequent to the May 22, 1998 Order which
has been entered by the Fort Peck Tribal Court and the dismissal of
this

action

in

no

way

precludes

subsequent

enforcement

of

subsequent Orders through a filing under theyUtah Foreign Judgment
Act, and which are otherwise enforceable m d e r law^.***™**^
Dated this.£^£_day of July, 1999 J

I

K

f

/$S^rJ\

/TIMOTHY R. HAriSQS-a:'C^
'DISTRICT COURT JUf
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JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801)359-8003

J
*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD
JAYNI SEARLE,
Petitioner,

)
)
")
)

AMENDED WRIT
OF ASSISTANCE

)

VS.

)

CaseNn.

BOYD SEARLE,

)

Judge Timothy R, Hanson

Respondent.

980905344

)

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for Writ of
Assistance on the

Day of

, 1998, Judge Timothy R. Hanson

presiding. The Court having reviewed the Objection submitted by Respondent, Boyd Searle and
having reviewed the Response submitted by Petitioner. The Court hereby finds:
1.

Respondent has failed to appropriately raise the due process issues before the tribal court
in a timely maimer.

2.

More than 30 days have passed since Respondent was placed on notice that Petitioner
was seeking to enforce the judgment in the State of Utah.

3.

The Court of Appeals having ruled that tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction.
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No grounds now exist that would prohibit the Court from entering the Writ of Assistance.
The Court hereby concludes that, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1911(d) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-22a-l (et. seq.), the order of the tribal court is properly before the court for Domestication.
Based upon this conclusion, the Court hereby recognizes the Order of the Fort Peck Assiniboine
»

•

and Sioux Tribal Court, gives it full faith and credit, and domesticates the order. Based upon
good cause appearing in the record before the Court and in Plaintiffs Petition for Writ of
Assistance, the Court hereby orders that the Sheriff, Law Enforcement, or Constable to use any
and all necessary and reasonable means to secure the person of Chad Searle and deliver him to
Jim C. Shirley at 9 Exchange Place, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah for delivery to the natural
mother. Any and all necessary and reasonable means shall include, but not be limited to,
entrance upon the premises located at: (1) the residence at 4885 South 3640 West, Keams, Utah;
(2) the residence at 4906 South 4460 West, Keams, Utah; or (3) Arcadia Elementary at 3461
West 4850 South, Keams, Utah and execute upon the attached Order.
DATED THIS

DAY OF

, 1998.
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
HFRTTFTPATF. OF MATTING

On this

_ day of

Jgpr^cu^ r . 19981 mailed, postage pre-paid First Class,

a copy of the foregoing Amended Writ of Assistance to:
Maria Christina Santana
*
Santana Law Firm
>
Attorney for Petitioner
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT
ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES
FORT PECK INDIAN RESERVATION
P.O. BOX 1027
POPLAR, MONTANA 59255
(406) 768-5557

State of Utah, Third District Juvenile Court

Order Accepting Jurisdiction

In the Matter of Chad Searle,
A Minor Indian Child

(Utah case # 948405)

Upon Motion of Gary M. Beaudry, ICWA Attorney for the Fort Peck Tribes and upon review
of the court order issued by Judge Olof A. Johansson of the Third District Juvenile Court, Salt
Lake City County, State Utah, in accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and good
cause appearing this court issues the following:
Findings
1. This matter is an Indian Child Welfare Act Proceeding as defined under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 as it pertains to a Termination of Parental Rights;.
2. The child subject to this proceeding is an Indian Child as defined under the Act and the
Fort Peck Tribes is the Indian Child's Tribe as defined under the Act;
3. The State court after due process issued an order transfering jurisdiction of this matter
to this Tribal court;
4. This court enjoys jurisdiction exclusive of any state court under 25 U.S.C. 1911(a).
NOWTHEREFORE it is the order of this court that:
1. The Fort Peck Tribal Court hereby accept jurisdiction and allow the child to be transported
from the State of Utah to the Fort Peck Indian Reservation by his Natural Mother, Jayni
Searle and
2. That the child shall remain under thejtemporary care, custody and control of his natural
mother Jayni Searle until further ord<ir of this court.
.— j _
nd
v
Issued and dated this 22 day of May 19*98.
~' —_
/..
Attest Clerk of Court
VA,

Chief Judge, A.T. Stafne

r
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